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ABSTRACT

Recent work at the intersection of law and behavioralbiology has
suggested numerous contexts in which legal thinking could benefit by
integrating knowledge from behavioral biology. In one of those

contexts, behavioralbiology may help to provide theoreticalfounda* Professor of Law & Professor of Biological Sciences, Vanderbilt University; Co-Director,
MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, Network on Decision Making. B.A.,
Amherst College; J.D., Yale Law School.
Erin O'Hara, Russell Korobkin, Joni Hersch, Kip Viscusi, David Herring, Paige Skiba,
and Bob Rasmussen offered useful comments on this manuscript. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
Rachlinski, Greg La Blanc, Paul Edelman, Rebecca Brown, Richard Epstein, Kathy Zeiler,
Susan Lambeth, Steven Schapiro, Oliver Goodenough, Jeff Stake, Ingrid Wuerth, Paul Zak,
and Christopher Yoo provided other commentary useful to us in various aspects of this
project, as did workshop participants at Cornell University Law School, Emory University
School of Law, and Vanderbilt University Law School, as well as at conferences of the Society
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, and
the Human Behavior and Evolution Society. We are grateful for research assistance from
Amanda Richardson, Mary Catherine Mareno, Susan Eisenberg, Michael Austin, Shang Cao,
Christopher Jaeger, and Martha Presley. The authors were funded, in part, by NSF grant
SES 0729244 to SFB and by Vanderbilt University.
** Assistant Professor of Psychology, Georgia State University; Visiting Assistant
Professor, Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research, University
of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center. B.A., Baylor University; Ph.D., Emory University
(Population Biology, Ecology, and Evolution).

1935

1936

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1935

tion for, and potentially increased predictive power concerning,
variouspsychologicaltraitsrelevant to law. This Article describes an
experiment that explores that context.
The paradoxicalpsychological bias known as the "endowment
effect"puzzles economists, skews market behavior, impedes efficient
exchange of goods and rights, and thereby poses importantproblems
for law. Although the effect is known to vary widely, there are at
present no satisfying explanations for why it manifests when and
how it does. Drawing on evolutionary biology, this Article provides
a new theory of the endowment effect. Briefly, we hypothesize that the
endowment effect is an evolved propensity of humans and, further,
that the degree to which an item is evolutionarily relevant will affect
the strength of the endowment effect. The theory generates a novel
combination of three predictions. These are: (1) the effect is likely to
be observable in many other species, including close primate
relatives;(2) the prevalence of the effect in other species is likely to
vary across items; and (3)the prevalence of the endowment effect will
increase or decrease, respectively, with the increasingor decreasing
evolutionary salience of the item in question.
The authors tested these predictions in a chimpanzee (Pan
troglodytes) experiment, recently published in Current Biology. The
data, further explored here, are consistent with each of the three
predictions. Consequently, this theory may explain why the endowment effect exists in humans and other species. It may also help both
to predict and to explain some of the variabilityin the effect when it
does manifest. And, more broadly, the results of the experiment
suggest that combining life science and social science perspectives
could lead to a more coherent framework for understanding the
wider variety of other cognitive heuristicsand biases relevant to law.
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INTRODUCTION

In a 2005 article, Jones and Goldsmith proposed and illustrated
twelve broad contexts in which legal thinking could benefit by
integrating knowledge from behavioral biology. 1 In one of those
contexts, they argued, behavioral biology can help to provide
theoretical foundation for, and potentially increased predictive
power concerning, various psychological traits relevant to law. This
Article describes the results of one effort to explore that context
empirically. Along the way, it attempts to pull various threads of
cognitive psychology, neoclassical economics, behavioral economics,
evolutionary biology, primatology, and brain imaging into the same
analytic space.
Specifically, this Article investigates whether insights from
behavioral biology might usefully join with insights from other
disciplines to help improve the theoretical foundation for, and
predictive power concerning, the "endowment effect." The endowment effect is within a suite of related behavioral phenomena often
referred to as reflecting "cognitive heuristics and biases."2 Not only
has the effect proven important to behavioral economists, 3 it also
plays a key role in a large and interdisciplinary research program
known to many as "behavioral law and economics."4 That research
1. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and BehavioralBiology, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 405 (2005). Goldsmith is Professor Emeritus of Biology at Yale University and author
of THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE (1991) and BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE (2001) (with Zimmerman). The twelve contexts included the following: discovering
useful patterns in regulable behavior; uncovering policy conflicts; sharpening cost-benefit
analyses; clarifying causal links; increasing understanding about people; disentangling
multiple causes; exposing unwarranted assumptions; assessing the comparative effectiveness
of legal strategies; revealing deep patterns in legal architecture; identifying selection
pressures that law creates; highlighting legal changes through evolutionary metaphor; and
providing theoretical foundation for, and potential predictive power concerning, various
psychological traits relevant to law.
2. See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (T.
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
3. The endowment effect is considered to be "among the most robust phenomena in the
emerging field of behavioral economics." Leaf Van Boven, George Loewenstein & David
Dunning, Mispredictingthe Endowment Effect: Underestimationof Owners' Selling Prices by
Buyer's Agents, 51 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 351, 351 (2003).
4. Although there are overlaps in methods and personnel, it is important not to assume
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program adds to (and in some cases challenges) neoclassical law and
economics reasoning with various behavioral findings, most of which
trace to work by cognitive psychologists.
As described more fully below, the endowment effect is a psychological phenomenon that appears to underlie some seemingly
irrational pricing of property and to thereby impede efficient
exchange. Because the effect seems inconsistent with standard
neoclassical, rational actor, expected-utility theory economic
assumptions, a large and growing swarm of articles and working
papers-by both traditional and behavioral economists, among
others-has explored and often contested its existence, causes,
boundaries, and implications. 5 And, because the existence of the
effect would suggest that one of the assumptions inherent in the
Coase Theorem is rarely if ever true in practice, many legal scholars
have raised concerns about the potential implications of the
endowment effect for a wide variety of legal approaches to distributing goods and rights.6
that behavioral economists and scholars engaged in behavioral law and economics (B.L.E.)
have exactly the same interests and priorities. Generally speaking, for example, although
behavioral economists may be friendlier to paternalistic policies (to combat cognitive
heuristics and biases) than are neoclassical economists, behavioral economists generally find
paternalism less appealing than B.L.E. scholars.
For an overview of behavioral economics, see, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Psychology and
Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998); Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and
Economics: Evidence from the Field (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13420, 2007), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w13420. For an overview of behavioral
law and economics, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115 (Peter Diamond
& Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).
5. For partial lists, see, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of
Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141,
1141-42 n.1 (2001); Serdar Sayman & Aye Onciiler, Effects of Study Design Characteristics
on the WTA-WTP Disparity:A Meta Analytical Framework, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289, 290-92
(2005).
6. A rough estimate of its influence: over 680 articles in the Westlaw journals and law
reviews (JLR) database use the term "endowment effect." Of course, the endowment effect is
not the only real-world consequence to suggest that, even in the utter absence of transaction
costs, inefficient outcomes may follow. See, e.g., Chullo Jung et al., The Coase Theorem in a
Rent-Seeking Society, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 259, 266 (1995) (concluding that even in
situations with low transaction costs "parties will attempt to rent-seek over the rights
distribution").
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the central problem.
It provides necessary foundation concerning the endowment effect,
describing what it is, how it manifests, why it matters to law, and
why there is much at stake. Part I also summarizes some prevailing
social science theories for what may cause the effect. It then
explains why these theories generally fail to provide a satisfying
theoretical foundation for the phenomenon and explains why, as a
consequence, we still lack any meaningful ability to predict or
explain either when the endowment effect will appear or its relative
magnitudes when it does appear.
Part II provides brief background on how life science perspectives
might provide useful insight into the endowment effect. It describes
why behavioral biology perspectives, in particular (and within that
set, a subset of evolutionary biology perspectives), may contribute
to a deeper and more scientifically coherent foundation for understanding the phenomenon, as well as provide some increased or
expanded predictive power about when and how it may manifest.
The Part then describes three novel predictions that arise in
combination from a behavioral biology perspective and from no
other known causal theory.
Part III then describes an experiment we and several colleagues
conducted with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and recently
published in a leading biology journal, CurrentBiology,7 to investigate those three predictions. We chose chimpanzees as our subjects
because our first prediction concerns a possible evolutionary root to
the endowment effect, which suggests that our closest primate
relatives-with bonobos (Panpaniscus)-mightalso exhibit it. This
Part discusses how the data currently provide evidence consistent
with each of the three predictions.
Part IV then reflects on some limitations of the experiment. It
considers a few possible confounds that could potentially be
inconsistent with our interpretation of the data. And it describes
how subsequent research might clarify these issues and extend our
understanding of the endowment effect.

7. Sarah F. Brosnan, Owen D. Jones, Susan P. Lambeth, Mary Catherine Mareno,
Amanda S. Richardson & Steven J. Schapiro, Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees, 17
CURRENT BIOLOGY 1704 (2007).
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Part V considers how the hypotheses explored here, and the
underlying theoretical framework they reflect, connect with the
existing endowment effect literature, as well as with developments
in brain-scanning.
Throughout, it should be remembered that our narrow focus on
testing life science perspectives about the endowment effect in
chimpanzees is only partly about the endowment effect itself, and
the relevance of deeper understanding of that effect to the legal
system. Although our work has potential implications for scholars
in behavioral economics, primatology, and law, the entirety of our
approach here is the exploratory front edge of a potentially promising research program that would-through synthesis of life science
and social science perspectives-aid law's efficiency and effectiveness by increasing the accuracy and robustness of the behavioral
models on which it necessarily relies.
I. THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT
A. What It Is and Why It Matters
As is well known, the Coase Theorem describes how-if several
assumptions are true and the initial distribution of property rights
is taken as a given-the end distribution in society of goods (and
other tradable things, such as options and permits) will be Pareto
efficient, regardless of the initial distribution.8 That is, people will
simply buy and sell goods and rights until they end up in the hands
of the people who value them most.
The assumptions include the absence of wealth effects (by which
one's demand for a good may vary with personal wealth), the
absence of significant transaction costs (which could impede the
ability of those who most value something from actually finding,
negotiating for, and acquiring it), and the rational valuation of
goods and rights.
8. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Note that
Coase never believed that the conditions of the Coase Theorem were true in practice. His
article was intended to highlight, rather than minimize, the significance of transaction costs,
and is more heuristic than empirical. James Lindgren, "Ol'Man River... He Keeps on Rollin'
Along" A Reply to Donohue's Diverting the Coasean River, 78 GEO. L.J. 577, 579 (1990).
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Of these three assumptions, we are here concerned with the third.
In this context, "rational valuation" means that the value a person
ascribes to a good or right will be stable and insensitive to logically
irrelevant circumstances. And the word "rational" bears its economic
meaning (referring to a substantively efficient choice, regardless of
the process deployed to achieve it) rather than to its common,
psychological meaning (which often suggests, in contrast, that one
is procedurally deploying self-conscious, analytic deliberation).'
In recent years, experiments in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics have given good reason to question whether in fact
people always, or even generally, value goods and rights as rationally as both law and economics have tended to assume. In many
experimental conditions, for example, it appears that people will
often and genuinely value an item they have just acquired at a
significantly higher dollar amount than the maximum price they
would have paid for that item the instant before they acquired it." °
That is, the instant people come to own something it often appears
to acquire extra value to them-as if from thin air-by virtue of the
mere fact of ownership. Importantly, this effect appears to arise
before people have time, for example, to learn more about the item
or to have experiences that may add sentimental value."
This propensity to value an item not solely on the characteristics
of the item itself, but also according to abstract notions of ownership, suggests that people are often pricing goods and rights
irrationally. 2 For example, suppose that five minutes ago Fred
9. Herbert Simon clarified the distinction this way: "The rational person of neoclassical
economics always reaches the decision that is objectively, or substantively, best in terms of
the given utility function. The rational person of cognitive psychology goes about making his
or her decisions in a way that is procedurally reasonable in the light of the available
knowledge and means of computation." Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and
Economics, 59 J. BuS. S209, S211 (1986).
10. See generally Sayman & Onciilar, supra note 5. Russell Korobkin provides one of the
best available overviews of the endowment effect, the studies of the phenomenon, and the
theories concerning its variations. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
11. For an overview, see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325,
1342-46 (1990); Korobkin, supra note 10; Sayman & Oncfiler, supra note 5.
12. There have been some interesting semantic discussions of whether or not, even if it
exists, the endowment effect is formally irrational. One can argue, for example, that once a
person's preference for the item has increased, then acting consistent with that preference is
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explicitly refused to purchase a given object for $25.00, thereby
clearly indicating that he values $25.01 in cash more than he values
that object. Under traditional economic reasoning, it should not
logically be the case that, were Fred suddenly to own that same
item, he would instantly and genuinely refuse to sell it for anything
less than (say) $40.00. That would suggest he suddenly now values
the item more than $39.99 in cash. Despite the apparent inconsistency, people often appear to behave this way. One experiment
suggested, for example, that waterfowl hunters would not pay more
than $247, on average, for hunting rights, but also would not sell
those rights for anything less than $1044, on average. 3 Another
experiment found that, while buyers would not pay more than $2.87
for a mug, sellers who had just been given the same mug would not
sell for anything less than $7.12.14
This instantaneous jump between the maximum price one would
have paid to acquire an item and the minimum price at which one
would sell the item (having just acquired it) is often called the
"endowment effect"1 because it seems to inhere at the moment
a
rational. Similarly, one could argue (perhaps tautologically) that seemingly irrational
behavior simply reflects rational, utility-maximizing behavior among people who share an
unexpectedly odd utility function. Alternatively, one could simply say that observed
disparities challenge expected utility theory as a good model for decision making under
uncertainty. Regardless of terminology, the key point is that the change in preference seems
irrational, and if it is so, then even "rational" pursuit of an irrational preference can make
problems for law.
13. JUDD HAMMACK & GARDNER MALLARD BROWN, JR., WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS:
TOWARD BIO-ECONOMic ANALYSIS 26-27 (1974).
14. Kahneman et al., supranote 11, at 1338-39.
15. Early studies include Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs.
Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Kahneman et al., supranote 11;
Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves,
79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparityin Measures of
Value, 99 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1984).
Some important recent studies include Robert Franciosi et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect, 30 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 213 (1996); John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E.
McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002); Brett
Inder & Terry O'Brien, The Endowment Effect and the Role of Uncertainty, 55 BULL. ECON.
RES. 289 (2003).
For useful literature surveys, see Korobkin, supra note 10; Nathan Novemsky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 119 (2005); Charles R.
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person is endowed with ownership rights. (The phenomenon is
sometimes alternatively referred to as a species of the status-quo
bias, or buying/selling price preference reversals, or referencedependentpreferences, or the offer/asking gap, or as either the WTPWTA gap or the WTP-WTA disparity, referring to the difference
between the maximum one is willing to pay (WTP) to acquire the
item and the minimum one is willing to accept (WTA) to sell it.' 6 )
The existence of an endowment effect suggests that-wholly
irrespective of wealth effects and transaction costs17-many initial
distributions of goods and rights will tend to be "sticky," and
therefore will not flow inexorably toward the most efficient distribution, as the Coase Theorem would otherwise predict.'" That is, they
will instead have a greater than expected tendency to adhere to the
hands of those people into whose hands they first get.
Some important scholarship has questioned whether buy/sell and
exchange asymmetries are meaningfully related to endowments, or
are instead the artifactual by-products of insufficiently controlled

Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of
Endowment Effect and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007) [hereinafter Plott &
Zeiler, Asymmetries); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness
to Accept Gap, the "EndowmentEffect, "Subject Misconceptions, and ExperimentalProcedures
for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) [hereinafter Plott & Zeiler,
Willingness].
16. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Kahneman et al., supra note 15; Julie R. Irwin,
Buying/Selling PricePreferenceReversals: Preference for Environmental Changes in Buying
Versus Selling Modes, 60 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 431 (1994); Michael S.
Haigh & John A. List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An
Experimental Analysis, 60 J. FIN. 523 (2005); Ian Bateman et al., A Test of the Theory of
Reference-Dependent Preferences, 112 Q. J. ECON. 479 (1997); Horowitz & McConnell, supra
note 15. Some consider the nomenclature non-trivial, arguing that the term "endowment
effect" not only describes the phenomenon of a pricing disparity, but also assumes that it is
the endowment and not some other potential feature of the situation that causes the
phenomenon. See, e.g., Plott & Zeiler, Asymmetries, supra note 15, at 1453. We take no
position on the merits of this debate over how to characterize asymmetries in exchange
behavior, but simply adopt the terminology that is most used and least cumbersome.
17. Some have suggested that the endowment effect is itself a subset of transaction costs.
But that is a semantic issue irrelevant to our discussions here.
18. Put another way: the endowment effect "implies that the initial assignment of the
good, however obtained, may well determine its ultimate allocation even when transaction
costs are zero." RICHARD EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM 211 (2003).
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experimental designs (including their instructions to subjects). 9 But
if the endowment effect is real, at least under some real-world
conditions, it arguably should matter a great deal to law.2 ° For
example, to the extent that the Coase Theorem assumes that "value
is independent of initial assignment,"2 1 and to the extent that
insights of the theorem inform some legal policies-such as those
underlying a market in pollution permits-then the stickiness of
goods and rights could be quite problematic, even independent of
transaction costs.22 It would underscore the extent to which, when
the legal system affects the distribution of goods and rights, the way
in which it does so has important economic consequences. That in
turn might suggest that the law could not so comfortably rely on
market behavior to move goods and rights into the hands of those
who will put them to the most economically productive use.23 Indeed
Arlen, Spitzer, and Talley have argued that "the endowment effect
undermines-or at least complexifies-the concept of social welfare
itself, making it difficult to define the cost and benefit of reallocating an entitlement."2 4
19. Plott & Zeiler, Asymmetries, supra note 15; Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 15.
20. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 4;
Korobkin, supranote 10.
21. Eric J. Johnson, Simon Gdchter & Andreas Herrmann, Exploring the Nature of Loss
Aversion 4 (Ctr. for Decision Research & Experimental Econ., Discussion Paper 2006-02,
2006).
22. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 290-91 (3d ed. 2000) (providing
several examples). As Johnson et al. put it: "For consumer choice, these asymmetries have
pervasive implications, suggesting that elasticities for product attributes will differ for
increases and decreases from current levels, and that there will be less trading and more
loyalty than would be suggested by a standard value maximization model." Johnson et al.,
supra note 21, at 4. EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 210, notes: "One object of a system of free
exchange is to move resources to higher valued uses. Unfortunately, that task is compromised
if the value of the good depends on who owns it, for then the social program now appears
circular."
The implications of the endowment effect can be far-reaching. Sunstein suggests, for
example, that the operation of policies concerning the allocation of broadcast spectrum (by
which, generally speaking, broadcasters are given broadcast rights for free) can be impeded
by endowment effects. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 499, 546-47 (2000).
23. For a discussion of how the endowment effect can have implications for legal thinking
about choices between property rules and liability rules, see Jeffrey Rachlinski & Forest
Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998).
24. Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within CorporateAgency Relationships,31
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (citing Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 15, at 103-12).
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Similarly, the very existence of disparities between how much
people would pay to acquire, and how much people would demand
to relinquish, can have significant effects for such things as
determining contingent valuations and just compensation.2 5
Willingness-to-pay data are not only provided to policy makers
considering the economic value of nonmarket environmental assets
(such as when determining the merits of a proposed habitat
improvement program).2 6 Willingness-to-pay data are also often
considered appropriate for establishing levels of compensation for
harms, as to coastal fishers after an oil spill, for example.2 7 That's
because conventional economic thinking tells us that willingness-topay and willingness-to-accept measures should be nearly identical.2"
Yet the existence of endowment effects suggests that using
willingness-to-pay measures to determine compensation may
substantially underestimate the loss.
In addition, the endowment effect can have implications for the
law of contracts. Portions of contract law are devoted to decreasing
transaction costs and enabling efficient breaches-in the belief that
goods and services will flow efficiently to those who value them
most. The presence of endowment effects suggests that decreasing
-- or even eliminating-transaction costs in contract contexts would
not guarantee this result. A person in possession of a contract right
may value it more than he was willing to pay for it, arguably
suggesting that traditional compensation after breach for such
things as lost profits and the costs of arranging substitute transactions may undercompensate. Indeed, endowment effects may even
warp the negotiation of contracts, as people may demand far more
to give up a standard provision in their own standard contracts than
they would have been willing to pay to acquire exactly what that
provision provides, if they had to bargain for it anew.2 9
25. For an example of careful thinking about this problem, see David S. Brookshire & Don
L. Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good. An Empirical Comparisonof Elicitation
Procedures, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 554 (1987); see also COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 507-55 (2006).

26. See Thomas C. Brown & Robin Gregory, Survey: Why the WTA-WTPDisparity Matters,
28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 323, 323-24 (1999).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 324 (citing R.D. Willig, Consumers'Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
589 (1976)).
29. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL
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Some have argued that the unpredictably low demand for reverse
mortgages-contracts in which homeowners sell homes to a bank in
exchange for an annuity and life insurance-may be a function of
irrational endowment effects. 0 Some find important implications of
the endowment effect for corporate law. 3 Others have explored the
implications of the endowment effect for such things as zoning,
takings, and the doctrine of adverse possession in property law, as
well as the fair use doctrine in copyright law. 2
Given the importance of the endowment effect, it would clearly be
useful to gain a deeper understanding of its causes and patterns. A
number of studies (mostly, but not exclusively, by psychologists and
economists) have suggested that one variable or another (such as
perception that a good was earned by one's performance, rather
than by chance) increases or decreases the probability of, and
magnitude of, endowment effects.33 There have been some significant efforts to try to categorize these variables-into economic and
psychological factors, for example 34 -and to assess their relative
significance.3 5
At present, however, the profusion of studies demonstrates
endowment effects that are all over the place, but not (yet)
predictable-appearing here, disappearing there-and showing very
large effects in some contexts with small effects in others.3 6 See
Figure 1. Studies are far better at discovering where the effect may
exist than why it does so." For example, endowment effects appear
to be present for mugs but not for tokens that can be exchanged for
mugs.38 Regular folk sometimes exhibit the effect, while those who
L. REV. 608 (1998) (discussing how the endowment effect may effect default rules in
contracts).
30. See Steffen Huck et al., Learningto Like What You Have-Explainingthe Endowment
Effect, 115 ECON. J. 689, 690 (2005).
31. See, e.g., Arlen et al., supranote 24.
32. See generally Korobkin, supra note 10.
33. A useful overview of these appears in id. at 1235-42.
34. See, e.g., Brown & Gregory, supra note 26.
35. See, e.g., Sayman & Oncifler, supra note 5.
36. See Brown & Gregory, supra note 26; Sayman & Oncuiler, supra note 5.
37. Cf. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Futureof BehavioralEconomic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1768-69 (1998) (observing this with respect to behavioral economic
studies of biases generally).
38. Kahneman et al., supranote 11, at 1329-32.
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professionally trade in the item in question sometimes do not.39
(Though sometimes even this finding is exactly reversed. °) And
some have proposed, 4 ' while others have found, that there are likely
variations in effect magnitudes as a function of some demographic
variables. The ratio of maximum price for purchasing and minimum
price for selling (which can be considered a measure of the magnitude of the effect) has been found to vary at least from .14 (which,
being less than 1, represents a reverse endowment effect) to 113.42
(One meta-analytic study reports a mean of 7.1 and a median of
2.9. 43)

39. See, e.g., John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.
J. ECON. 41 (2003) (showing that endowment effects diminish or disappear among
experienced, professional traders, for their traded items); John A. List, Neoclassical Theory
Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615 (2004); John
A. List, Substitutability,Experience, and the Value Disparity:Evidence from the Marketplace,
47 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 486 (2004).
40. See, e.g., Haigh & List, supra note 16.
41. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimismof the New BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907 (2002); Jones,
supra note 5.
42. See, e.g., Sayman & Oncuiler, supra note 5, at 300, 302 fig. 1.
43. Id. at 300.
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Figure 1: Histogram of WTA/WTP Ratio. The scale of the horizontal axis
compresses at the right. Reprinted from Serdar Sayman & Aye Onciller, Effects
of Study Design Characteristicson the WTA-WTP Disparity: A Meta Analytical
Framework,26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289, 302 (2005), with permission from Elsevier.
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It can hardly be overemphasized that most, perhaps all, of these
studies arise from essentially theory-free trial-and-error explorations-investigating everything from eggs, density of park trees,
and lottery tickets to odor-free air, electric service reliability, and
binoculars. 4 Meaningful theories of causation that might help to
explain observed anomalies within the endowment effect, lead to a
systematic investigation of the effect, help to predict future
manifestations of the effect, or aid law's ability to combat the effect
(where appropriate) are still up for grabs.4 5

44. See id. at 301 tbl.1; see also Brown & Gregory, supra note 26, at 325 tbl.1.
45. A meta-analytic study concluded, for example, that the phenomenon "seems to be, to
some extent, good-specific[,] [but] [t]he reason for this is not clear." Sayman & OncUler, supra
note 5, at 308.
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B. Causes of the Endowment Effect
This is not to say there aren't theories. Some have speculated that
endowment effects are caused principally by the role of personal
wealth in valuation processes. 46 Others have argued that a person's
"preference uncertainty" or unavoidably strategic misrepresentation
of preferences underlies endowment effects.4 v Others speculate that
the inevitable transaction costs to changing your mind, and
implementing that change, might be sufficiently great to explain a
rational bias toward the status quo. 48 Others-including those who
have attempted formal models-argue that buying scenarios create
a materially different expectation and reference point than selling
scenarios and that this explains the phenomenon. 9
But the prevailing perspective at present appears to be that
endowment effects are merely specific instances of generalized "loss
aversion" (and related phenomena).5 ° Loss aversion describes a
mental condition whereby a person weighs the losing of a thing he
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1247-49.
See Sayman & Qnciiler, supra note 5, at 291.
Personal Communication with Kip Viscusi (Feb. 2006).
See Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-DependentPreferences,
121 Q. J. ECON. 1133 (2006).
50. See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Three Cheers-Psychological,Theoretical, Empirical-for
Loss Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 129 (2005); Johnson et al., supra note 21; Kahneman et
al., supra note 15; Kahneman et al., supra note 11; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss
Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039 (1991). An
overview of relevant phenomena appears in BARON, supra note 22, ch. 11, ch. 12. For
discussion in legal contexts, see Chris Guthrie, ProspectTheory, Risk Preference,and the Law,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1115 (2003) (discussing prospect theory, of which loss aversion is a
component); Korobkin, supranote 10, at 1242-55.
A concise summary of prospect theory appears in BARON, supra note 22, at 250-60. In brief,
prospect theory suggests that "preferences are characterized by two fundamental features:
(1) reference-point dependence (i.e., gains and losses are evaluated from some reference point),
and (2) loss aversion (i.e., the notion that individuals experience more disutility from losses
than they do utility from gains of the same size)." Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler,
Asymmetries in Exchange Behavior Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Prospect Theory 3
n.8 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meeting, Working Paper No. 63, 2005) (citing Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)) (cited by permission). Tversky and Kahneman phrase this
somewhat differently in 2000, but loss aversion remains a central feature. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representationof Uncertainty,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 44, 45 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). For
more detail, see DellaVigna, supra note 4.
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has more heavily than the failure to gain that same thing from
someone else-even though the two conditions are economically
equivalent. This is commonly summarized: losses loom larger than
gains.
If one accepts that people are generally loss-averse, then loss
aversion indeed seems to explain endowment effects. But there are
several reasons why loss aversion is unsatisfying as a theoretical
foundation for this phenomenon.
First, it comes suspiciously close (if not closer) to explaining one
mystery with another, merely abstracting the causal question up
one level. As one commentator put it, explaining the endowment
effect with loss aversion is like saying that rain is caused by a
rainstorm.5 If the endowment effect reflects loss aversion, then
where does loss aversion come from?
Second, loss aversion is an assumption, not a theory.52 It does not
purport to explain why this seemingly irrational predisposition is
spatially and temporally widespread and directionally oriented as
it is. Why, when pricing goods and rights, are people more afraid to
lose something they have than they are to lose the opportunity to
gain the same thing? Is it just coin-flipping odds whether humans
might instead have been more afraid to lose the opportunity to gain
something than to lose it?
Third, recourse to the loss aversion assumption provides no
coherent basis-none at all-for predicting how the presence and
magnitude of the endowment effect will vary, or according to what.53
Knowing that potential losses are weighed more heavily than
equivalent potential gains simply does not (and cannot) help us
explain existing and observed variations in endowment effect
magnitudes, or predict where future effects are most likely to be
found. While it is true that hundreds of researchers are out there
enthusiastically cataloging the prevalence of and magnitudes of
endowment effects for various groups encountering various goods
and services, no one has a clear vision of what variables-in product
51. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1865-66
(1994).
52. CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 50, at xiii.

53. On the limits of prospect theory, with respect to predictive power, see W. Kip Viscusi,
ProspectiveReference Theory: Toward an Explanationof Paradoxes,2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY

235, 238 (1989).
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or service attributes, in contexts, or in people-are actually relevant
to record or experimentally manipulate. Loss aversion provides no
help in making such predictions.
Fourth, simply situating the endowment effect within loss
aversion overlooks the possibility that the effect may connect at
some deeper causal level to the other cognitive quirks that have
attracted attention in recent years and which collectively constitute
the core of behavioral economist's concerns. These include
intertemporal choice anomalies, irrationally discounted futures,
framing problems, mistaken assessments of probability, and the
like.54 Ideally, scholars should seek a broader theoretical foundation
that could reconcile all or many of these at once.5" Given the wide
variety of cognitive heuristics, biases, and quirks that have been
feted as significant to human behavior, economics, and legal
regimes, we should aspire not to ad hoc explanations for each, but
instead to a connective theory that might make seamless and
coherent sense of the phenomena as a group.
The next Part very briefly describes a hypothesis, derived from
behavioral biology, that may offer a significant step toward eventual
understanding of these greater puzzles. Specifically, it may help to
improve the theoretical foundation for understanding the phenomenon, may help to explain the breadth and directionality of the effect,
may help improve our predictions about where the effect will arise
and with what relative consequence, and may help to connect the
effect, at a deeper level, to other law-relevant quirks in human
psychology.
To be clear, we do not propose that behavioral biology provides all
the answers. But we think it is an important part of any coherent
answer. And, given the current vacuum (in which predictions derive
principally from observed patterns and assumptions, rather than
from theory), any theory offering even modest predictive gains will
represent significant progress. Some will argue that the endowment
effect is not so much caused by 'loss aversion" as it is a function of
"prospect theory"-of which both "loss aversion" and "reference
54. See generally supra note 4. A collection of some of the key works in behavioral
economics appears in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer, George
Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin eds., 2004).
55. For one argument for such a theory, see Jones, supra note 5.
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dependence" are parts. Regardless, our point here is that these
latter three terms, concepts, or theories, in whatever combination,
provide no theoretical foundation in the scientific sense. They are,
instead, descriptions of observed patterns in the variables that
appear to be correlated with the phenomenon at issue. They are not
theories of why those particular patterns in those particular
variables exist.56

II. AN EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS
This Part does three things. Section A provides brief background,
for context, on the general relationship between law, biology, and
behavioral models. It explains why-as a threshold matter-we
think it often important to consider information from the life
sciences when seeking to understand human behavior relevant to
law. Section B very briefly summarizes some prior theoretical
work,57 which drew on behavioral biology to detail bases for
hypothesizing that the endowment effect (among other cognitive
heuristics and biases) may reflect an evolved behavioral predisposition that is common to Homo sapiens, at least under some circumstances. Section C describes three specific, novel predictions arising
from this work (as to which the subsequent Part will provide
experimental data).
A. Law, Behavior, and Behavioral Models
By way of background, the basic logic connecting law and
behavioral biology is this:5" Law (construed broadly) exists largely
to effect changes in human behavior.59 (For when humans already
behave as society wants, legal interventions are unnecessary.) Law's
ability to effectively and efficiently deploy legal tools to achieve
these changes often (though, importantly, not always) depends on
56. For more on prospect theory generally, see supra notes 50 and 53.
57. See Jones, supranote 5.
58. A lengthier and more detailed explanation appears in Jones & Goldsmith, supra note
1, at 411-23.
59. This is not to deny that there are expressive functions to law, beyond the instrumental
functions. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339 (2000).
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the accuracy of the behavioral models on which law relies. The
behavioral model is that which sums our empirical and theoretical
understandings of why people behave as they do and how they are
likely to change their behaviors as a function of changes in law. (For
example, a behavioral model may reflect the assumption that youth
violence is largely a function of cultural messages transmitted
through television and video games, which should therefore be
regulated, or may reflect the assumption that making it harder to
divorce will cause married couples actually to reside together
longer.) So, speaking metaphorically, the behavioral model is a
fulcrum on which the lever of law rests. And a soft fulcrum-that is,
an insufficiently accurate and robust behavioral model-will
undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of law's purposive
interventions.
With some exceptions (particularly in the arena of economics),
contemporary behavioral models in law are rarely explicit. The
models, and their constituent assumptions about behavior, vary by
jurisdictions, regulatory bodies, and behaviors. And viewed as a
whole, the models are unsystematic and informed by various
amalgamations of experience, path dependence, observation,
intuition, trial-and-error, self-reflection, imitation, hope, and the
influence of various disciplines that seem appealing at a particular
time. Despite their surface differences, however, the behavioral
models law deploys are generally similar in one important respect:
their nearly wholesale reliance on social science insights to the
exclusion of the many life science insights regarding where behavior
comes from, how it emerges and develops, what various processes
give rise to behavioral patterns across a species, and how multiple
causal influences intersect in body and brain to enable and generate
behavior.
This exclusion of life science perspectives on behavior reflects the
general division within a university, whereby, with only minimal
overlap, human behavior is studied in one set of buildings, and the
behavior of every other species on the planet is studied in a different
set of buildings. But that structural comfort is obsolete and belies
the underlying problem. There are no bright boundaries between
psychology and biology, since all psychological phenomena arise
from and operate within an evolved and biologically corporeal
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brain.6" Indeed, there are no bright boundaries between biology and
economics, as economic principles (choice, under conditions of
scarcity) are inherent in evolutionary processes-and evolutionary
processes (including natural selection) are reciprocally the most
relentlessly economizing forces in the history of life (resulting in
tendencies, within both plants and animals, to bias form, function,
and behavior toward substantively "rational" outcomes).61
To be clear, social science perspectives are valuable and not to be
overlooked or underestimated. We are not arguing that life science
perspectives should somehow supplant social science perspectives.
Instead, we and a number of other scholars make the more modest
argument that in order to construct the best available behavioral
model for the lever of law, it will be useful to integratesocial science
and life science perspectives into a more unified whole.6 2 Behavioral
biology (composed of a variety of subdisciplines, including evolutionary biology, behavioral ecology, cognitive neuroscience, behavioral
genetics, and others) already constitutes an enormous body of
literature, nearly untapped by legal thinkers, which is now growing
at an accelerating pace. And some of the things that this literature
reveals may prove useful to understanding phenomena such as the
endowment effect.
B. Applying Behavioral Biology Perspectives to Endowment Effects
The remainder of this Article builds on a variety of foundational
concepts in evolutionary biology detailed elsewhere.63 The key
60. That is, incidentally, why so many psychology departments have in recent years "gone
neuro"--shifting investigations into neurological phenomena.
61. There is growing interest in the relationship between evolutionary biology and
economics. See, e.g., Larry Samuelson & Jeroen Swinkels, Information,Evolution, and Utility,
1 THEORETICAL ECON. 119 (2006); Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Evolutionary Efficiency and
Happiness (Working Paper, 2005). For discussion of similarities and differences, see Owen D.
Jones, Erin O'Hara & Jeffrey E. Stake, Law, Economics, and Biology (submitted).
62. An extensive bibliography of such sources (maintained by Owen D. Jones) appears on
the website of the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (S.E.A.L.) at http://www.
sealsite.org/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
63. Key works in evolutionary biology generally include MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (3d ed.
2003) and DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998). Useful works with
behavioral emphases include TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY,
EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN NATURE (2001) and JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (8th ed. 2005). Primers written explicitly for legal thinkers also
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concept for present purposes is that evolutionary processes have
inevitably influenced (though generally not determined, an important distinction) various human behavioral predispositions by
affecting the structure and operations of the human nervous system,
including its most significant feature, the brain.
The two-paragraph sketch is this: Evolutionary processesincluding natural selection, sexual selection, mutation, genetic drift,
and gene flow 4 -influence the commonly observable external
anatomy (morphology) of every species, such as large ears in rabbits,
sharp teeth in sharks, and opposable thumbs in primates. Similarly,
those processes also influence the internal structure and capabilities, such as olfactory senses, digestive systems that convert
external resources into energy, and mechanisms (such as hearts) to
circulate oxygen and nutrients. Most importantly for present
purposes, the reach of evolutionary processes into internal structures and operations extends to shaping nervous systems themselves, which are the essential connection between mere anatomy,
on one hand, and successful organismic functioning, on the other.
That is, evolutionary processes have left every animal species
with nervous systems that incline bodies to engage their evershifting surroundings with behaviors that, on average, were more
likely to result in successful reproduction, within persistent environmental features of a species' evolutionarily recent past, than did
alternative behaviors. Put simply, evolutionary processes lead to
future generations of organisms that are better able to deploy their
physical capabilities in circumstances appropriate to the context.
For example, and at the most general level, animals are more likely
to flee danger than to embrace it, to select appropriate foods and
mates for their species, and so forth. And beyond this, evolutionary
processes can narrowly tailor behavioral predispositions to variations in circumstances regularly encountered in evolutionary
history, such as to cause a greater likelihood of fleeing the danger
of a predator than of fleeing the danger of confrontation with a
same-sex challenger in a mating competition.

appear in Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, and Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in
Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1127-57 (1997).
64. See generally FUTUYMA, supra note 63; RIDLEY, supra note 63.
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Thus, organisms' behavior and decisions, on average, increase
fitness (e.g., reproduction) in their natural social and physical
environments, because evolutionary processes have selected for
these behaviors and winnowed others from the population. Wildbred organisms within species tend (on average) to make substantively rational behavioral choices65 (at least for the historical
environments long occupied by the species) because evolutionary
processes have winnowed away heritable predispositions toward
structures and states of nervous systems that tended to lead toward
behavior that was less beneficial or had a sufficiently high potential
for disaster.6 6
What all this means is simply that evolutionary processes have
created brains with (among other things) algorithmic (that is, "ifthen") operations. These in turn yield states of the nervous system,
which in turn spark physical changes (such as increased heart rate,
sexual arousal, the motivating effects of hunger, and the like), that
in turn tend to result in adaptive behaviors, compared to other
possibilities. Depending on context, these inclinations can be weak
or strong. And depending on species, there may be greater or lesser
ability to reflect on consequences and actively choose alternative
behaviors. 7 Given both the extent to which natural selection6" can
65. Recall that substantive rationality is distinct from procedural (deliberative)
rationality. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
66. Note that this does not mean that every organism will behave rationally. There is
inevitable variation, particularly in sexually reproducing species, which typically yields
genetically unique individuals. Natural selection does not guarantee that heritable
maladaptive features won't arise; instead, it operates in such a way that, all else equal and
given variation in the population, the most maladaptive features will tend to become less
prevalent in successive generations. See supra note 63.
67. Note that some species are genetically predisposed to choose one particular alternative
and that this requires no understanding on the part of the organism. It is essential to
recognize that even the capacity of many species to learn is a result of evolutionary processes,
which involve considerable tradeoffs. The human brain, for example, is roughly 2 percent of
the body's mass, but consumes roughly 20 percent of its energy, a circumstance only
sustainable because the advantages such a large brain provides generally outweigh the
disadvantages (energy costs, difficult childbirths compared to other primates, and so forth).
David Attwell & Simon B. Laughlin, An Energy Budget for Signaling in the Grey Matter of the
Brain, 21 J. CEREBRAL BLOOD FLOW & METABOLISM 1133, 1133 (2001).
68. Natural selection is the result of three conditions: (1) replication of genes; (2) variation
of genes (as a function of mutation, as well as unique combinations of genes arising from
sexual reproduction); and (3) differential reproduction of individual organisms (as a
consequence of their genetic variation). Put simply, randomly arising heritable traits that
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(and does) winnow context-specific, condition-dependent, algorithmic behavioral predispositions, many of the general regularities of
human behavioral predispositions (in contexts of fear, love, or anger,
for example) have been acted upon by natural selection and are
adaptations to environmental conditions that have been prevalent
over our evolutionary past (and have not yet been selected

against) 69
True, humans differ from other animals in their highly developed
capacities for behaviors such as language, analysis, and extensive
cumulative culture. And it would be here, as generally, unsound
to simply assume that all behavioral regularities reflect speciestypical psychological adaptations. We do not do so.7 ° But it would be
equally unsound to unreflectively assume (as is generally assumed
in the literature discussing cognitive heuristics, biases, and irrationalities71 ) that psychological features under study are unrelated
to adaptations. Natural selection exerts powerful influences over
vast aspects of behavior in all species, and taking its effects into
consideration can consequently be useful for, among other things,
generating hypotheses that when tested can yield new and useful
information.
Specifically, one general line of inquiry-raised somewhat
differently and independently by Gigerenzer,72 Haselton,7 3 and
Jones 7 4 -is that species-wide patterns in behavioral predispositions
provide incremental advantages to their owners in survival and reproduction tend to appear,
all else equal, in increasingly large percentages of subsequent populations, often becoming so
widespread as to be characteristic of the species.
69. There is far more to this proposition than can be discussed here. This subject is
covered in greater detail in Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 423-31.
70. Moreover, there is no such thing as a "perfect" adaptation. This is true for several
reasons, including that the variation (mutation) may not have occurred, environments
continue to change, natural selection may work on a suite of related behaviors rather than on
a single one, and 'perfect' adaptation in one area may cause problems in another. Thus, not
all adaptations will be perfectly fitness enhancing, nor will they always appear (or be) ideal.
71. For an overview, see generally Jones, supra note 5.
72. See GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000).
73. See, e.g., Martie G. Haselton & Daniel Nettle, The ParanoidOptimist:An Integrative
Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 47 (2006)
(discussing error management theory, in the context of cognitive biases).
74. Jones, supranote 5. For discussion of similarities and differences among these views,
see Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Psychology and the Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 958-60 (David M. Buss ed., 2005).
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that appear to be substantively irrational may be the product of a
mis-match between an evolved predisposition of the brain and one
or more novel environmental features. That is, the brain may incline
us toward behavior that was once adaptive but is often, under
modern conditions, less so-in the same way that moths navigated
quite effectively by celestial lights before electricity but behave
"irrationally" today when encountering streetlamps. Or in the same
way that the human taste for sweets and fats inclined us adaptively
toward high energy foods when these were scarce, but now results
in temptation and health problems in an evolutionarily novel world
of boundless, ultra-concentrated calories. Extending this reasoning,
the endowment effect may reflect an evolved inclination that is
irrational under many present conditions, but that (perhaps like
other heuristics and biases identified in recent years) may have
proved useful under long-stable (but meaningfully different)
ancestral conditions.75
In 2001, one of us (Jones) laid theoretical foundation for this idea,
which will not be reiterated here.76 In sum, it proposed that a large
number of current irrationalities comprising the collected heuristics
and biases-including endowment effects 7 7 -might all be reconciled
under a principle that could be called (in the context of and
language of rational actor economics) time-shifted rationality.Timeshifted rationality describes "any trait resulting from the operation
of evolutionary processes on brains that, while increasing the
probability of behavior that was adaptive in the relevant environment of evolutionary adaptation in the ancestral past, leads to
substantively irrational or maladaptive behavior in the present
environment."" Put another way, the set of all irrational psychologi-

75. Of course, whether or not an inclination is adaptive says precisely nothing,
normatively, about whether it should be cultivated, accommodated, or countered. For further
discussion of this point, see Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, 484-85.
76. See Jones, supra note 5; Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of Irrationality, 41
JURIMETRICS J. 289 (2001). These were later augmented by the work of Jones & Goldsmith,
supra note 1.
77. Other features addressed include inconsistent preferences, over-cooperativeness,
intertemporal choice anomalies, irrationally discounted futures, framing problems, mistaken
assessments of probability, ultimatum games, irrational taste for spite, and the like. Jones,
supranote 5, 1169-87.
78. So defined in id. at 1172.

1960

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1935

cal features may include a subset of features that once (and indeed
long) were substantively rational, in the traditional economic sense.
As argued there, endowment effects might be the results of
adaptations to conditions in which the probable results of continued
possession were less risky than the probable results of attempted
exchanges.79 That is, the historical contexts for exchange involved
evolutionarily significant risks that are simply less present under
modern conditions. This time-shifted rationality perspective focuses
attention on the fact that such things as reliable exchanges, abstract
notions of "rights" to things, doctrines governing contracts, highly
organized mechanisms for enforcing bargains, money, banks,
increased median life spans, interest rates, storable surpluses of
resources, reliable futures, and even the language enabling complex
communication and negotiation are all environmental features that
arose since our differentiation from the other apes, and are thus
fairly recent (in some cases extremely recent) in our species'
evolutionary history. 0 In particular, exchanges are fraught with the
potential for defection, particularly in the absence of reliable
property rights and third-party enforcement mechanisms (such as
the legal rules and institutions of modern humans).
The core notion is therefore this: it may be the modern conjunction of an evolved psychological predisposition and these novel
environmental features that render a general leaning toward the
79. For a recent and different perspective on possible evolutionary underpinnings of the
endowment effect, see Steffen Huck et al., supranote 30. Various mentions of possible effects
of evolutionary processes on the endowment effect also appear in PAUL RUBIN, DARWINIAN
POLITICS: THE EVOLUTION OFPOLITICALPREFERENCES 173 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1565 (1998); Jeffrey E.
Stake, The Property "Instinct,'359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SocY B. 1763, 1767 (2004).
More recently, an economist has independently adopted a similar view. Herbert Gintis, The
Evolution of Private Property, 64 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 2-3 (2007). And biological
perspectives on property, generally, are appearing with increasing frequency. See, e.g., UtaMaria Niederle, From Possession to Property: Preferences and the Role of Culture, in
COMPLEXITYAND THE ECONOMY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY (John H. Finch & Magli
D. Orillard eds., 2005); Gintis, supra; Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones,
The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007); Stake, supra. A
recent argument connecting evolutionary processes to prospect theory, to which the
endowment effect is related, is forthcoming in Rose McDermott, James H. Fowler & Oleg
Smirnov, On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences, 70 J. POL. (forthcoming
2008).
80. See, e.g., Jones, supranote 5, at 1183-85.
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endowment effect (which can also be described as the tendency to
"hang on to what one has") "irrational."
C. Predictions
In light of the foregoing, and starting in 2000, Jones 8 1-and
subsequently Jones and Brosnan2 -predicted
that:

in a series of talks

(1) The endowment effect, if it exists, is likely to be observable
in many other species, including primate relatives.
(2) The prevalence of the endowment effect in other species is
likely to vary across items.
(3) The prevalence of the endowment effect will increase or
decrease, respectively, with the increasing or decreasing
evolutionary salience of the item in question.

Here's why: Prediction One (endowment effect in close primate
relatives) follows if the endowment effect has deep evolutionary
roots (perhaps in adaptation to the asymmetric risks of keeping
versus exchanging), rather than being either a random psychological
quirk of modern humans, or a very recently and wholly culturallycontingent phenomenon. 3
Prediction Two (endowment effect likely varies with characteristics and contexts of items) follows because brains evolve under
specific conditions, not broad theoretical ones. As a consequence,
while human brains have some general, self-conscious, deliberative
analytic capabilities, we have every reason to believe (and neuro81. E.g., Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Biology and Endowment Effects, Address at Arizona
State University College of Law (Apr. 2004); Owen D. Jones, Evolution, Behavior, and Legal
Systems, Plenary Address, Human Behavior and Evolution Society Annual Conference (2007).
82. E.g., Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Investigating Endowment Effects in
Chimpanzees, Address at Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research (May 2005);
Sarah F. Brosnan, Owen Jones, Susan P. Lambeth & Steven J. Schapiro, Endowment Effects
in Chimpanzees, Address at American Society of Primatologists Annual Meeting (June 2007).
83. Of course, it could have evolutionary roots of comparatively recent origin, i.e.,
subsequent to the divergence of human and chimpanzee lineages. However, primate relatives
are a good place to look for evidence that it may be older than the divergence. For example,
one recent study suggests the more general phenomenon of loss aversion may be present in
capuchin monkeys. Laurie Santos & Keith Chen, "The Economics of Nonhuman Primates,"
Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain Symposium, NYU, Jan. 11-13, 2008.
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scientific work is daily confirming) that they also have some
anatomically and functionally specialized cognitive mechanisms.'
Selection pressures can narrowly tailor brain structures and
reactions (and regularly do) to environmental conditions long
encountered over evolutionary time. To illustrate, consider the
way humans process information signaling danger. Sometimes,
particularly when the stimulus is evolutionarily salient (such as
when unexpectedly encountering a snake), the brain's evolved
information-processing predispositions typically yield immediate
emotional attention and reaction. At other times, such as when
people learn that electrical sockets can kill, the risk can only be
processed through more analytic parts of the brain, which do not
necessarily yield the emotional responses honed by evolutionary
processes. 5 Biologically speaking, basic emotions-such as fear,
disgust, love, lust, and the like-are simply states of the nervous
system that reflect evolved shortcuts, inclining us in the direction
of behaviors-fleeing, avoiding, pursuing, mating, and the
like-that had, and often continue to have, adaptive value. And just
as different parts of the brain are involved in assessing different
kinds of risks (e.g., evolutionarily salient snakes versus invisible
electricity), it is more likely than not that different regions of the
brain are involved in assessing the value of very different kinds of
items-particularly items that vary in evolutionary salience.
If so, one expects there to be variations in the prevalence of and
magnitudes of the endowment effect across kinds of items. For
example, there is simply little reason to assume that all items in
one's environment (e.g., concrete tangible goods, on one hand, and
abstract, imaginary "rights" to goods, on the other) are valued using
the same general-purpose cognitive machinery. The more an item
is either similar to items that, or can be used in contexts that, were
long part of a species' evolutionary history, the greater the likelihood that evolved, heuristic valuation mechanisms will be currently

84. See generally THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 2004);
GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 63; PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE (Eric R. Kandel et
al. eds., 2000).
85. Unless, of course, a person has had personal experience with an electrical shock. In
that case, fear conditioning-an adaptation to quickly learn to avoid novel, negative stimuli
in a changing environment-may render a similar reaction as the snake would.
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activated and the greater the likelihood that resultant behavior will
reflect an endowment effect.
Prediction Three (evolutionary salience is likely to increase
manifestation of the endowment effect) follows by combining the
logic for Prediction Two with these following additional premises: (1)
the fitness risk entailed in giving up an evolutionarily salient item,
and getting nothing in return, is greater than the symmetric risk of
losing a less evolutionarily salient item; (2) natural selection can
make (and in many contexts has made) brain operations, and
resultant behaviors, sensitive to asymmetric costs of alternative
behaviors; and (3) the longer the item in question has been within
a category of items that was persistent across the species' evolutionary history and also important to the reproductive success of
members of that species, the more likely it is that neural processes
for valuing the item will draw upon evolutionarily old parts of the
brain, with concomitant emotional short cuts toward valuation. So
some objects (such as food items) are likely to be more evolutionarily
salient than other objects (such as DVDs). And tangible goods (such
as mugs) may be more evolutionarily salient than abstractions (such
as tokens that can be exchanged for mugs).86 Consequently: if the
endowment effect is an evolved feature, then (all else being equal)
its prevalence and magnitudes may increase with the evolutionary
salience of the objects and conditions, compared at least to far more
novel objects and conditions.

III. AN EXPERIMENT WITH CHIMPANZEES
The three sections in this Part describe, respectively, an experiment designed to test those predictions, the results of that experiment, and some implications."
A. ExperimentalDesign
Starting in 2004, the two of us teamed together to begin testing
these hypotheses in chimpanzees. The experimental design was
86. There is evidence, for example, that mugs yield endowment effects while tokens for
mugs do not. Kahneman et al., supranote 11, at 1330-32.
87. See Brosnan et al., supra note 7.
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inspired by (but is in several important ways quite different from)
an experiment by Knetsch.8 8 In the Knetsch design, college students
within three groups encountered three different conditions.
Students in the first group were offered in advance of a questionnaire a choice between a coffee mug and a chocolate bar, as
compensation for completing the questionnaire. Students in the
second group were given a coffee mug at the beginning of the task,
as compensation, then offered at the end of the task the opportunity
to exchange it for a chocolate bar. Students in the third group were
given the chocolate bar at the beginning of the task, as compensation, then offered the opportunity to exchange it for a coffee mug at
the completion of the task.
Under the choice condition, 56% of the students (N = 55) selected
the mug. For the group endowed with the coffee mug, 89% (N = 76)
refused to trade it for a chocolate bar. For the group endowed with
the chocolate bar, only 10% (N = 87) agreed to trade it for the mug.89
If one assumes that an initial preference under a choice condition
for mug or chocolate bar was evenly distributed across the three
groups, then these results suggest an endowment effect. That is,
nearly 90% of the students endowed with a mug refused to trade it
for a chocolate bar, while at the same time 90% of the students
endowed with the chocolate bar refused to trade it for the mug. In
each case, people exhibited a strong tendency to hang on to what
they had.
Our chimpanzee experiment was designed to use the same three
conditions, with some important differences. First, whereas in the
Knetsch experiment each subject encountered only one condition, we
tested each of our chimpanzee subjects in all three conditions (in a
different sequence with each condition completed on different days).
88. Knetsch, supra note 15.
89. Id. at 1278. In a similar experiment, three groups of college students responded to
three different conditions. Students in the first group, designated as choosers, were asked
individually to choose between a coffee mug and a sum of cash, for each of a variety of prices,
ranging from $0.00 to $9.25. Students in the second group, designated as sellers, were given
the mug and asked to indicate whether or not they would sell the mug at each of the same
price intervals. Another group, designated as buyers, examined an identical mug, and were
asked to indicate their willingness to buy one at each of the same price intervals. The results
were aggregated for each group, revealing that the median valuation for choosers was $3.12,
the median valuation for sellers was $7.12, and the median valuation for buyers was $2.87.
The large discrepancy between the median valuations of sellers and buyers-for the same
item-suggests an endowment effect. Kahneman et al., supranote 11, at 1338-39.
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We used this method both because chimpanzees are less numerous
than college students and because it seems useful to collect
information about the individuals that did and did not display
endowment effects (if any), rather than simply aggregating the data
to find effects between groups, instead of within individuals.9 °
Second, there is no suggestion in our chimpanzee experiments that
the chimpanzees "earned" the items they were given, which is a
potential confound in the Knetsch design. Third, our chimpanzee
subjects were offered the opportunity within only two to five
seconds, under exchange conditions, to trade the item they had for
the item they didn't (whereas the longer duration of "ownership" in
the Knetsch design is also a potential confound). Fourth, our
protocol was designed to measure the endowment effect (if any)
separately for non-food and food items, so as to allow a direct
comparison of the independent effects for the two different kinds of
items themselves.
Specifically, the non-food items in our chimpanzee experiment
were common dog toys: one rope toy and one rubber bone toy. Toy
items such as these are known to be interesting to the subject
chimpanzees, who have frequent interaction with similar items,
both in material and form, as enrichment on a regular basis.9 '
Selecting suitable food items was trickier for three reasons: (1) our
experimental design required that a chimpanzee not only have
(own) an item, but also that he or she have a meaningful opportunity to exchange it for another item; (2) chimpanzees tend to
immediately eat any food they acquire; and (3) all items had to be
shaped to easily fit through the mesh of a fence wall for exchange to
occur.

90. Interestingly, although there are many dozens of articles reporting on endowment
effect experiments, most report effects that are evident across groups encountering different
conditions from each other, rather than effects that are evident within individuals
encountering a series of different conditions. See Horowitz & McConnell, supranote 15, at 426
(describing typical experiment). There has been remarkably little discussion of the potential
differences between within-subject designs and between-subject designs. One exception is
Sayman & Onciler, supra note 5, at 296, 305.
91. "Enrichment" refers to items and activities providing for the psychological well-being
of non-human primates, as required by the 1985 Animal Welfare Act (AWA). See generally
KRISTINA M. ADAMS, M.S., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AWIC RESOURCE SERIES No. 32,
ENVIRONMENTAL ENRICHMENT FOR NONHUMAN PRIMATES RESOURCE GUIDE (July 2006),
availableat http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/Primates2006/Primates.htm.
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In the end, Brosnan developed an experimental technique
involving: (1) a popsicle of frozen fruit juice (which chimpanzees,
like humans, consume fairly slowly) and (2) peanut butter inside a
length of common PVC (polyvinyl chloride) pipe, with a small stick
protruding (which enabled but slowed the extraction of peanut
butter). Again, both frozen fruit juice and peanut butter are known
to and well-liked by the subject chimpanzees, and all subjects were
competent at eating peanut butter in this fashion. Neither food was
consumed so quickly as to eliminate the opportunity for exchange.
Our thirty-three, adult chimpanzee subjects (nineteen females
and fourteen males) were drawn from a colony of captive chimpanzees at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine
and Research of the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center.9 2 These subjects lived in multi-male, multi-female social
groups of between seven and fifteen individuals which had been
stable for more than thirty years. These groups were housed in large
outdoor compounds connected to a series of indoor runs. All
compounds and runs were equipped with vertical climbing structures, resting platforms, ropes and swings for climbing, and other
material enrichment such as bedding, branches, and toys. In
addition to their basic diet, subjects received enrichment feeds of
fruits, vegetables, and treats (yogurt, nuts, seeds) four times a day.
All subjects had continuous, on-demand access to primate chow and
water and were never food- or water-deprived for any testing.
For the study, subjects were first trained to exchange (or, in many
cases, were reminded of prior training in exchange). Specifically, the
chimpanzees were trained to exchange inedible items (such as a
tongue depressor) for a food reward. They were then trained to
exchange one food item (such as a carrot) for a preferred food (such
as a grape). When a given chimpanzee could, on a new day,
exchange at least four out of five times, unprompted except by the
outstretched hand of the research assistant, which cued an opportunity to exchange, then he or she qualified as a subject for the
experiment. (In practice, subjects exchanged virtually every time
the experimenter offered the opportunity.)
92. By primatological standards, thirty-three subjects provide an enormous n. Captive
populations of primates generally have few individuals (even for far smaller primates, such
as capuchins), such that many leading primate studies reflect experiments with fewer than
ten individuals.
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For non-food items on one hand, and then food items on the other,
there were three separate conditions--one choice condition (to
establish preference) and two exchange conditions (to investigate
possible endowment effects, given separately expressed preference).
We will illustrate these three experimental conditions discussing
the non-food items.
In the choice condition, a research assistant beyond arm's reach
of the chimpanzee offered a rope toy in one hand and a bone toy in
the other. (Across chimpanzees, the hand in which each toy
appeared was varied, so as to eliminate the possible confound of any
side preference.) The chimpanzee expressed his or her preference,
as between the two offerings, by gesturing to the item it preferred.
The chimpanzee then immediately received that item, and that
individual's preference for rope toy or bone toy was recorded.
In one of two exchange conditions, the chimpanzee was shown
both items, then received either the rope toy or the bone toy and,
approximately two to five seconds later, was offered the opportunity
to exchange it for the other toy.93 The willingness to exchange, or the
refusal to exchange, was recorded. If no exchange took place within
three minutes, the trial was recorded as a refusal to exchange.9 4
In the other of the two exchange conditions, the chimpanzee
received the toy it had not received in the prior exchange condition,
and was again offered the opportunity to exchange it for the other
toy. If under these conditions a chimpanzee refused to trade a less
preferred item for a more preferred item, we consider that some
evidence for an endowment effect (ownership-dependent valuation)
in chimpanzees. That is, such a circumstance suggests that the
value of the less-preferred item when "owned" immediately jumped
to more than the value of the item in the choice condition. We
included controls to eliminate other obvious possibilities.
The three conditions (choice, exchange, and exchange) were
presented in random order to each subject, counterbalanced so that
93. The delay is short for two reasons. First, a much longer delay (say, a minute) would
have enabled the subject in the food conditions to consume the item entirely. Second, and as
a consequence, it would be inappropriate to consider the chimpanzee's subsequent inability
to exchange consumed food as a refusal to exchange. That approach would simply skew the
data in favor of our predictions. Thus, the short delay represents a conservative approach.
94. Note that in the case of food items, the chimpanzee lost the ability to exchange if more
than a single taste of the food was consumed.
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one-third saw each condition first. This is done to counteract any
influence that the order of the conditions may have upon the
outcome. One-half of the subjects began with the food condition,
completing all of these trials prior to participating in the non-food
condition. The other half of the subjects completed the non-food
condition first. All testing was done with the chimpanzee subjects
temporarily isolated from their peers within one of the runs in their
indoor enclosure. This guards against the possibilities that subjects
will alter their behavior as a function of the presence of others (as
is known to occur in other contexts), and that future subjects will
alter their behaviors as a function of observing the behavior of prior
subjects (also known to occur). The three conditions using the food
items were conducted in the same way as for toys (except that, given
that food is divisible, any attempt by the chimpanzee to exchange a
food item after more than one taste or bite was counted as a refusal
to exchange).
B. Results
Thirty-three individuals completed all three sessions involving
food items, and thirty-one individuals completed all three sessions
involving non-food items.9" We analyzed the data in two ways. First,
we compared aggregated chimpanzee choices to expected choices, on
the basis of the group preferences. We refer to this below as the
"group level analyses." Second, we compared each individual
chimpanzee's choices to that chimpanzee's own expressed preference

95. This discrepancy is due to the fact that some individuals would not come inside from
their outdoor enclosure to be tested alone (usually due to social situations within their large
groups) and therefore not all sessions could be completed on all individuals. We obviously
cannot force a chimpanzee to participate, but we also only test subjects who voluntarily come
in to assure that their choices are not due to an experimentally meaningless attempt to
complete the study and exit the experiment.
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in a choice condition.96 We refer to this below as the "individual level
analyses."
The data support each of the three predictions at both the group
level analyses and the individual level analyses, which are summarized in subsections 1 and 2 respectively.
1. Group Level Analyses
a. Prediction1
Our first prediction was that the endowment effect is likely to be
observable in chimpanzees. The group level data support this
prediction. As a group, 58% of the chimpanzees preferred the peanut
butter to the juice when given a choice between the two. However,
when endowed with the peanut butter, 79% of the chimpanzees
preferred to keep the peanut butter rather than exchange for juice
(X2 = 6.079, p = 0.014). This result indicates that approximately 20%
more of the group kept the peanut butter than would be expected
from the group-wide preference. Likewise, when endowed with juice
(preferred by 42% of the subjects), 58% of the chimpanzees chose to
keep the juice rather than exchange for peanut butter (X2 = 3.102,
p = 0.078). That indicates that approximately 15% exhibited an
endowment effect for the juice.97
96. There are ample reasons to believe that subjects understood both the choice condition
and the exchange condition. Chimpanzees are highly intelligent primates. See JANE GOODALL,
THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE (1986). They are skilled at cognitive tasks. See PRIMATE ORIGINS
OF HUMAN COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR (T. Matsuzawa ed., 2001). They understand exchange
tasks with each other, D. Paquette, Object Exchange Between Captive Chimpanzees:A Case
Report, 7 HUM. EVOLUTION 11 (1992); John C. Mitani, Reciprocal Exchange in Chimpanzees
and Other Primates,in COOPERATION IN PRIMATES AND HUMANS (Peter M. Kappeler & Carel
P. van Schaik eds., 2006), and with humans, Charles W. Hyatt & William D. Hopkins,
Interspecies Object Exchange: Barteringin Apes?, 42 BEHAV. PROCESSES 177 (1998); Sarah F.
Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Responses to a Simple Barter Task in Chimpanzees, Pan
troglodytes, 46 PRIMATES 173 (2005); Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Tolerance for Inequity May
Increase with Social Closeness in Chimpanzees, 1560 PROc. ROYAL SOC'Y B. 253 (2005). They
are also proficient at using the dichotomous choice task to indicate preference. See Sarah F.
Brosnan et al., Chimpanzee Autarky, 3 PLOS ONE e1518 (2008).
97. We also analyzed the data using a Cochran's Q Test for multiple comparisons
(nonparametric) and found significant variation between the three conditions (N = 30,
Cochran's Q = 7.6, df = 2, p = 0.022). We further analyzed the results with post hoc pairwise
comparisons and found that there was a significant difference between their tendency to keep
the item (say, juice) when given it, on the one hand, and their tendency to exchange for the
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b. Prediction2
Our second prediction was that the strength of the endowment
effect in chimpanzees would vary across items. The group level data
support this prediction. The group as a whole preferred the bone to
the rope 74% of the time in the preference tests. However, when
endowed with the bone, subjects kept it only 16% of the time (Figure
2; X2 = 54.587, p < 0.001) and, when endowed with the rope (26%
preference), subjects kept it only 10% of the time (X2 = 4.212, p =
0.040).9" These are significantly different from the corresponding
figures for the food conditions (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; z = -4.59,
p < 0.001). 9 Both of these indicate far more exchange of non-food
items than would be predicted by the separately expressed preferences for these items individually. This is an intriguing "reverseendowment effect," indicating that when these non-foods are
involved, chimpanzees either do not have strong preferences or
prefer opportunities to interact with the experimenter to the item
itself.'00 The essential finding for this stage of the analysis is that
the prevalence of endowment effects varies considerably across
items.

same item (juice), when given the other (McNemar's Test; p = 0.013). This is consistent with
an endowment effect, as the preference for an item changes depending on whether it was
given to them initially or they were required to exchange to get it, with a higher preference
if it was the initial endowment.
98. Again, we analyzed the data using a Cochran's Q Test for multiple comparisons
(nonparametric) and found significant variation between the three conditions (N = 30,
Cochran's Q = 28.5, df = 2, p < 0.001). McNemar's Test indicates a significant difference
between their tendency to keep the item (say, bone) when given it, on the one hand, and their
tendency to exchange for the same item (bone), when given the other (p < 0.001). Moreover,
subjects were significantly likely to keep an item if given it in the exchange tests than
indicated in the preference tests (p < 0.001). Both of these results are consistent with an
endowment effect.
99. As many readers will know, this means that the likelihood that this result arose from
chance alone is less than 1 in 1000, which far exceeds the standard threshold in science--5
in 100, (or p < 0.05)-at which data are accepted as likely due to the experimental
manipulation, rather than chance.
100. There are some intriguing leads in the literature that suggest the endowment effect
also occasionally reverses in humans. See, e.g., Sayman & Onciuler, supra note 5, at 300. To
our knowledge, there has to date been no systematic study of contexts in which the
endowment effect reverses, which in our view warrants separate examination.
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Figure 2: Group-Level Comparisons of Preferences in the Choice and Exchange
Conditions. Gray bars represent the percentage of the group that preferred the
object in a choice condition and black bars represent the percentage of the group
that chose to maintain possession in the exchange condition. Figure reprinted from
Sarah F. Brosnan et al., 17 CurrentBiology 1704 (2007).
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c. Prediction3

Our third prediction was that the endowment effect will generally
be more pronounced or less pronounced, in accordance with the
relative degree of evolutionary salience. We therefore predicted that
if our Prediction 2 were correct (i.e., that the prevalence of the
endowment effect would vary between non-food and food items),
then the prevalence of the endowment effect for food items would be
significantly greater than for non-food items. The group level data
support this prediction. The group level endowment effects for the
two food items ranged from 15% to 20%, whereas for the non-food
items they ranged from -16% to -58%.101
101. As mentioned earlier, our study design counterbalanced the initial presentation (i.e.,

first condition any individual chimpanzee encountered) to minimize the bias inherent in
multiple sampling of the same group. However, we still found it interesting to examine
separately the choices made in each subject's first encounter with either a choice or exchange
condition. We then compared independent groups, as was done in the Knetsch study, using
the group in the choice condition to establish a baseline group preference. Even looking just
at this subset of our data, the data remain consistent with our main finding of an endowment
effect for food items, and reveal the same general pattern as shown in Figure 2. However, the
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2. Individual Level Analyses
a. Prediction1
Recall that our first prediction was that the endowment effect was
likely to be observable in chimpanzees. The individual level data
support this prediction. If the endowment effect were to be present
at the individual level, we would expect that a subject would twice
refuse to exchange, both: (1) maintaining possession of the preferred
item; and (2) also maintaining possession of the less-favored item.
This was, in fact, the most common behavior for food items, with
42% of individuals maintaining possession of both foods-that is,
their preferred food and their less-favored food, the latter of which
is consistent with an endowment effect (Figure 3; X2 = 9.14; p < 0.05;
i.e., the likelihood that these results are due to chance alone is less
than 5%). Eighteen percent of individuals behaved inconsistently
with their preference under the choice condition, maintaining
possession of the less-favored food and exchanging their preferred
food. (This behavior is difficult to interpret; while maintaining the
less-favored food is consistent with an endowment effect, exchanging the preferred item may indicate the individual does not have
strong preferences between the two items.) Thirty-three percent of
the subjects showed exchange behavior that matched their preferences, maintaining possession of a preferred food item and exchanging a less-favored item for the preferred one. Only 6% of subjects
exchanged for the other food in both situations, indicating a
preference for interaction or exchange.
b. Prediction2
Our second prediction was that the strength of the endowment
effect in chimpanzees would vary across items. The individual level
data support this prediction.

statistical power of that particular inquiry of the subset of the data was very limited. For
although we are testing an enormous group, given the rarity of chimpanzees, it is still too
small for a meaningful conclusion using this alternate approach.
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Figure 3: Percentage of Individual Subjects Exhibiting Endowment Effect for NonFoods Versus Foods
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Whereas 42% of the chimpanzees exhibited an endowment effect
in the trials involving food items, only one of the chimpanzees-or
3%-exhibited an endowment effect in the toy condition. That is: (1)
when given the toy they had preferred under the choice condition,
they refused to exchange it for the less preferred toy; and (2) when
given the less preferred toy, they also refused to exchange it for the
previously preferred toy. The majority of subjects exchanged in both
toy situations, that is, regardless of which item they initially
possessed (Figure 4; 77% of subjects, X2 = 39.41, p < 0.05). This
result may indicate that, when given less evolutionarily salient
objects, subjects are more interested in the interaction of performing
the exchange than in the items themselves. Of the remaining
individuals, 6% showed exchange behavior consistent with their
established preferences (e.g., exchanged the less-favored item and
did not exchange the preferred item) and 13% showed exchange
behavior inconsistent with their established preferences.
c. Prediction3
Our third prediction was that the endowment effect will generally
be more pronounced or less pronounced, in accordance with the
relative degree of evolutionary salience. The individual level data
support this prediction. The prevalence of the endowment effect was
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far greater for food items (42%) than for non-food items (3%). See
Figure 3 & Figure 4. Note that, had we tested only non-food items,
it might have seemed quite reasonable to conclude that chimpanzees
do not exhibit endowment effects.
Figure 4: The Behavior of Individuals in the Four Tests. "Kept both" indicates
individuals who chose to maintain possession of both foods or both non-foods rather
than exchange. "Kept preferred" indicates individuals who chose to maintain
possession of their favorite item, but exchanged for the other when endowed with
their less preferred. "Kept non-preferred" indicates individuals who chose to
maintain possession of their non-preferred item, but exchanged for the other when
endowed with their preferred item. "Exchanged both" indicates individuals who
chose to exchange for the other item in both situations. Solid bars indicate food
items and gray bars indicate non-food items. Figure reprinted from Sarah F.
Brosnan et al., 17 CurrentBiology 1704 (2007).

C. Discussionof Results
All three predictions are supported in both group level and
individual level analyses, and these data are supported by a variety
of subsequent controls, to test for a variety of possible confounds
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(described below in Part IV). First, to our knowledge, our study is
the first to have documented endowment effects in chimpanzees.
Second, our data show that, in chimpanzees, the prevalence of the
endowment effect varies across items. Moreover, our data show that
the prevalence of the endowment effect in chimpanzees varies across
items within single individuals. Third, our data show that the
prevalence of the endowment effect for food items is significantly
greater than it is for non-food items, which is consistent with our
hypothesis that evolutionarily salient items are more likely to yield
endowment effects than less evolutionarily salient items.
Several items bear noting. First, it is important to clarify that our
finding should not be understood to merely suggest that chimpanzees like food more than they like toys (though this is likely the
case). What we instead tested for and found was that, when given
opportunities to trade within a class of items (food on one hand, and
toys on the other), chimpanzees are far less likely to trade their lesspreferred food for their more-preferred food than they are to trade
their less-preferred toy for their more-preferred toy. This simultaneously demonstrates an endowment effect, shows that the
probability of the effect varies across items, and suggests that the
probability that the effect will manifest varies with the evolutionary
salience of the item in question.
Second, there is, on the surface, some seeming tension between
the results of our experiment and the results of the Knetsch
experiment mentioned earlier. Though Knetsch apparently did not
set out intentionally to compare food with non-food items (and to our
knowledge has not considered the distinction potentially meaningful), Knetsch happened to have done so and happened to have found
high levels of endowment effects for both food and non-food items,
while our chimpanzee data find sharp variation. There are at least
several possibilities that confound meaningful comparison of the two
studies. The Knetsch study, but not ours, involved possession of the
objects by study subjects for an extended period of time before the
opportunity to exchange. It seems possible, even probable, that the
longer one has possession of an item, the greater the likelihood of an
endowment effect. In addition, the Knetsch study, but not ours, gave
subjects items as compensation or reward for doing a task, which
may have increased the prevalence of the effect. In addition, our
study, but not Knetsch's, compared effects within classes of items,
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instead of across classes of items. And finally, our study, but not
Knetsch's, involved within-subject trials and analysis, instead of
only across-group trials and analysis. Some researchers have
concluded that across-group designs generally find a greater
prevalence of the endowment effect than within-subject designs-and
this may also affect the relative prevalence of the
10 2
effect.
Third, it is not a simple matter to compare the prevalence of the
endowment effect in chimpanzees to the prevalence of the effect in
humans, much as it would be useful to have a clear comparison. At
a minimum, it is clear that in humans, as in chimpanzees, many
study subjects do not exhibit the endowment effect, even when other
study subjects do. Ideally, we would like to know how the percentage of humans who actually exhibit the effect, in various experimental conditions, compares to the percentage of chimpanzees who
exhibit the effect. But this turns out to be more difficult to determine than originally expected.
One reason is that most endowment effect experiments have been
more concerned with the magnitude of the difference between
median or mean WTA and WTP prices among study subjects than
they have been with an examination of the percentages of the study
subjects who actually manifest the endowment effect.0 3 Moreover,
the vast majority of studies are across-group studies, rather than
within-subject studies.' 4 Consequently, they generally report the
median price for a group of sellers, on one hand, and the median
price for a separate group of buyers, on the other. And when
comparisons are made across these different groups, under different
test conditions, the existence of significantly different median
buying and selling prices in the different groups is considered
evidence that the endowment effect exists within individuals-even
though, technically speaking, the individuals themselves have
generally not been separately tested in buying and selling scenarios.

102. Sayman & Onciller, supra note 5.
103. Horowitz and McConnell reach a similar conclusion when considering patterns in data
aggregation. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 15, at 430 ("Most studies report only mean
WTA / mean WTP, even when open-ended WTA and WTP values were collected from all
individuals.").
104. See supranote 90.
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Even among the relatively few within-subject studies that have
been conducted, the data are not generally published in a way that
enables a reader to determine the percentage of study subjects who
actually exhibited the endowment effect. A tiny set of studies,
outliers in this respect, do report data that enable some calculation
0 5 And an examination of one of these
of percentages by readers."
studies suggests that the range of human subjects who appeared to
exhibit endowment effects (under those precise experimental
conditions) ranged widely, from 53% to 95%.106
The endowment effect percentage we report for chimpanzees in
food exchange conditions (42%) is beneath the low end of the range
in this particular subset of published endowment effect experiments. However, even if we were to assume that this small subset
of human experiments were a representative sample, comparing it
to our data in chimpanzees nonetheless indicates a robust endowment effect.
IV. POTENTIAL CONFOUNDS, LIMITATIONS, AND RESEARCH

QUESTIONS
Every experiment entails a risk of unidentified confounds,
uncontrolled variables, and limitations inherent in the data. In
Section A, we report the results of several control experiments,
which exclude several potential confounds. In Section B, we describe
some potential limitations of our analysis.
A. Control Conditions
1. Stability of Preferences
In the initial study, we ran only a single food-preference test, in
order to avoid overexposing the subjects to the foods and, thus,
potentially altering their preferences. This left open the possibility
that the preferences of the subjects were not stable. To verify that
the food preferences were stable over a series of choices, we ran
105. See Knetsch, supra note 15, at 1278, 1280-81; Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 15, at
511-14; Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 1331-42.
106. Kahneman et al., supranote 11.
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three additional control sessions at the conclusion of the study. In
each session, subjects made four choices between the same food
items as in the original study, using the same procedures, as in the
original protocol. Overall, the group maintained its preference for
peanut butter, chosen by 69% of subjects. The preference was
extremely consistent, with 69% of subjects choosing peanut butter
in the first of the three sessions, and 67% of subjects choosing
peanut butter in the first trial of each of the three sessions. This
consistency indicates that the single choice in the original study
adequately described the group food preferences. On an individual
level, 87% of subjects favored one food at least two-thirds of the time
across the twelve trials, including all but one (91%) of the subjects
who showed an endowment effect in the exchange study.
2. Effect of Interaction with Experimenter
Our second control probed the extent to which some of the
exchanges could be due to a preference for interacting with the
experimenter, rather than a preference for the other offered item.
We presented subjects (in random order, counterbalanced across
subjects) with opportunities to trade each of the four objects for an
identical object. No subject exchanged the peanut butter. Only one
subject exchanged the juice. This indicates that food rewards were
indeed more valuable to the chimpanzees than was the exchange
interaction. For the toys, the converse was true. Eighty-two percent
of subjects (twenty-four of twenty-nine) °7 traded a bone for a bone.
Seventy-nine percent (twenty-three of twenty-nine) traded a rope for
a rope. This compared to 84% of subjects trading a bone for a rope
and 90% of subjects trading a rope for a bone in the original
exchanges. Therefore, for toys, maintaining the contrast to the
result for foods, we find no significant evidence of an endowment
effect. For toys, the interaction with the experimenter is apparently
and very widely preferred over the object itself.

107. The sample size for the controls is slightly smaller than the sample size for the
original experiment because several subjects were no longer available for testing. Specifically,
several had developed age-related health problems, and several were moved to a chimpanzee
retirement facility.
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3. Willingness to Exchange: PotentialRole of Distrust
Our third control investigated whether our data might reflect a
generalized unwillingness of chimpanzees to trade foods, which
might, for example, suggest that their reluctance to trade lesspreferred food items for more-preferred food items in the original
study was attributable to some distrust of the experimenter or other
cause not attributable to the endowment effect. This was not the
case. We ran two experiments to verify this.
First, we offered subjects the opportunity to trade a smaller piece
of frozen juice for a whole stick. Thirty-five percent (ten of twentynine) of subjects were willing to make this trade. Problematically,
however, the smaller piece of frozen juice was bite-sized (1.5 or 3
inches in length), which enabled immediate consumption, and
consequently precluded subsequent trade. Consequently, in the
second experiment, we ran the same study but with foods that could
not be eaten rapidly (to help avoid potential complications from poor
impulse control). Specifically, the chimpanzees were presented with
the opportunity to trade a whole frozen juice stick (the same size as
in previous tests) for a banana (which is a generally preferred food)
of approximately the same length. Importantly, twenty-six of
twenty-nine subjects (90%) exchanged on the first presentation and
the remaining three did so on the second trial.
This indicates that our subjects were indeed willing, under the
right circumstances, to exchange a lesser-valued food for a morepreferred one. The evidence we see of an endowment effect for foods,
compared to toys, is not a generalized reluctance to trade away any
valuable food. That is, while 58% of chimpanzees kept the juice stick
when offered a trade for a peanut butter tube, only 10% kept it
when offered a banana (and none kept it in their second trial). The
subjects' willingness to give up the juice stick under this control
condition indicates that the chimpanzees who kept an item in the
endowment conditions of the original study did so because they
preferred to keep it-and not out of concern that they would lose
both commodities to an untrustworthy experimenter.
Indeed, the remarkable difference between exchange behaviors
for food and exchange behaviors for non-food items, both in the
original test and in the additional controls described here, further
supports the conclusion that the frequent failure to exchange a less-
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favored food for a more-preferred food was not due to a generalized
inability or unwillingness to exchange, or to a lack of desire to
interact with the experimenter. Instead, this was an active choice
to maintain possession of the food item.'
B. Some Cautions
All studies have limitations. Our study has five worth noting.
First, corroboration never alone proves causation. This is a single
study. While the data are consistent with each of our three predictions, they do not prove that the underlying theory that generated
these predictions is necessarily correct. There may be other, better
theories that generate these predictions.
Second, varying familiarity of objects may be an important
confound. We have interpreted the difference in endowment effects
between food and non-food conditions as likely reflecting the
difference in the evolutionary salience between them. But other
differences may be at work. For example, the observed differences
might trace to variations between the objects other than the
foodlnon-food distinction. Among the variety of possibly relevant
distinctions (such as shapes, colors, or even consistencies of objects)
108. There are, of course, several additional explanations one might raise. However,
several of the more likely possibilities do not explain the data as well as the evolutionary
hypothesis. As one example, this effect cannot be attributed merely to chimpanzees' inability
to delay gratification in situations involving food. Chimpanzees are known to delay
gratification for food within their reach for at least 120 seconds, far longer than in the current
study. Michael J. Beran, Maintenance of Self-Imposed Delay of Gratification by Four
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and an Orangutan(Pongo pygmaeus), 129 J. GEN. PSYCHOL.
49, 63 (2002). For another example, some models of the endowment effect predict it will be
weaker for items that one consciously knows one cannot keep indefinitely (see Koszegi &
Rabin, supra note 49, at 1134-35), which might arguably be the case for toys, as compared to
foods. Yet, while this more deliberative explanation might theoretically have played some role
in our subjects' responses, chimpanzees routinely keep what they have from humans, until
they are ready and willing to give it up, a fact with which all of these chimpanzees have
extensive experience. Finally, it is possible that some attribute of the items affects behavior.
For instance, food may require extensive processing time, giving it more value upon
acquisition because of these additional costs. On the other hand, toys may be valuable only
for their novelty. Yet in our study, subjects were very likely to exchange toys for an identical
toy, indicating that the novelty of the item was not particularly salient. If anything, the most
obvious possibility is that subjects like the act of exchange, and that food outweighs the utility
of the exchange interaction while objects have less utility than the interaction. While this is
undoubtedly true, such reasoning begs the question that the evolutionary analysis explains,
namely why chimpanzees prefer food over objects and interactions in the first place.

20081

A NEW THEORY OF THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT

1981

the most likely potential confound is familiarity. These specific dog
toys were novel objects.
We think it unlikely that the toys were sufficiently novel for
novelty alone to drive the observed differences. The toys are similar
to other introduced objects the chimpanzees have encountered
during their regular enrichment activities. Specifically, they have
encountered many small plastic/rubber toys, similar to (but not) the
bone, and they have regular exposure to rope toys, though not to
this particular rope toy. Moreover, the subjects manifested no
obvious predilections as a consequence of novelty-such as extended
periods of examination before deciding whether to trade.
Third, the strength of subject preferences may be a significant
confound. It is possible that the observed difference in endowment
effects between food and non-food items reflects variation in the
strengths of the preferences within classes (where a class comprises
either food items or non-food items). That is, those who prefer
peanut butter to juice, or vice versa, may have much stronger
absolute and relative preferences than corresponding preferences for
bone or rope toys.
It is not exactly clear how one would disentangle the strength of
the preference between within-class objects from the difference in
strength of preference between food and non-food classes. One
possibility we have considered would involve establishing the price
of one unit of an item (say, a single grape) in the currency of another
item (say, six slices of cucumber). This could be revealed by
incrementally increasing the units of the less preferred item until
the aggregated units of that item caused a switch in preference to
them.
However, there are some practical problems with this. If we did
not give the preferred item to the subject immediately after he
gestured for it, we would undermine the pattern we have established, introducing (for the chimpanzee) a new and significant risk,
i.e., that expressed choices will be unfulfilled. If, on the other hand,
we give the preferred item after each increment, satiation with (or
desire for diversity among) consumed food items could confound
interpretation of subsequent choices. This could theoretically be
avoided by making each incremental increase on separate days. But
this is impractical, given the time required-thirty to sixty
minutes-to run a single session with each chimpanzee.
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Fourth, our subjects are captive animals. It is of course possible
that our chimpanzee subjects are behaving differently than they
would under more natural conditions (although this particular
facility works very hard to maintain a natural social environment
and sufficient enrichment). For practical reasons, it would be
extremely difficult to eliminate this potential confound. Moreover,
we find it no more limiting than, say, the common use of college
students in human studies, rather than representative samples of
the species.
Fifth, evolutionary salience is a continuous variable, and one that
potentially varies by context. (For example, the evolutionary
salience of an apple when one is starving is arguably different than
when one is sated.) This creates some potential challenges.
In addition, time-shifted rationality suggests that there will
sometimes be inclinations that cut in opposite directions, the net of
which is not always clear. For example, ascribing a single measure
of evolutionary salience to, say, a hunting permit-wherein the
permit is evolutionarily novel, while hunting is evolutionarily
salient-may yield substantial difficulties. Similarly, while the
evolutionary relevance of status signaling is quite clear, the
currency of status changes with context. So, for example, a motor
vehicle is not very evolutionarily salient, on one hand, because it is
a new invention, built of new materials. On the other hand, cars
(like houses, clothing, and watches) are pretty reliable, visible
indicators of access to resources and have thus become signals of
status. At present, we would estimate that this nets out such that
high-status goods (many of which are high-wealth goods) would
generally generate larger endowment effects, on average, than goods
less associated with resources and status. But further work needs
to be done to provide our hypothesis with greater precision respecting such goods.
V. CONNECTIONS

We explore two kinds of connections that link our hypothesis to
the work of others.
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A. Connections to Other Endowment Effect Experiments
We do not provide here any exhaustive account of where our
evolutionary salience hypothesis does or does not connect to,
explain, or differ from existing endowment effect studies. There are
many hundreds of them, with virtually every one having a unique
methodology, and analyzing them on the metric of our hypothesis
simply requires a separate undertaking. Instead, we offer in this
section a few thoughts on how our hypothesis connects to some of
the extant literature.
Recall that our general view is that things closer to having
survival and reproduction relevance (such as foods) will generally
be more evolutionarily salient and, therefore, more likely to
generate comparatively larger endowment effects than those things
more distant from survival and reproduction relevance. In addition,
our view suggests that, on balance, tangible things will be more
evolutionarily salient than intangibles, and consequently more
likely to generate comparatively larger endowment effects. And,
among intangibles, those things with greater implications for
survival and reproduction will yield greater effects than their
counterparts.
We are not claiming that our theory would ultimately yield a way
to quantify such things with precision. Instead, we suggest that
evolutionary salience will be one of the factors explaining some of
the variance in prevalence of and magnitudes in endowment effects.
Of course (as should be clear by this point) in each case relevance for
survival and reproduction is not measured in terms of current
rationality, but is instead measured in terms of time-shifted
rationality-such that it is not simply present circumstances, but
estimated prior circumstances in which the brain initially evolved,
that are relevant.
Consequently, our hypothesis may help to explain a number of
existing patterns and puzzles that other researchers have discovered. Among them:
An experiment, which its authors expected to reveal different
endowment effect magnitudes for more and less familiar items
(both of which happened to be food), found no such difference. 10 9
109. See Bateman et al., supra note 16, at 502. The items were Coke and an uncommon
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" A very recent meta-analysis of endowment effects concluded
that the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept gap was
generally larger for goods with "intrinsic value" and for "healthrelated" goods than for other kinds of goods." °
" The same meta-analysis found that the disparity appears
larger with actual ownership than hypothetical ownership."'
" A study showed endowment effects for individuals acting on
their own behalf, yet virtually no endowment effect when
individuals acted (abstractly) in an2 agency capacity on behalf
of the shareholders of a business."
" A study concluded that the magnitude of the willingness-topay/willingness-to-accept disparity appears to be greater for
environmental improvements than for market items." 3
" A study showed that coffee mugs generate an endowment
effect, while inherently useless things (such as a token or IOU)
that can be exchanged for (and are therefore abstractly
equivalent to) the same mugs do not." 4
B. Connections to Research on Brain Structure and Function
The time-shifted rationality perspective" 5 suggests that various
cognitive heuristics and biases may stem, in large measure, from
evolved features of neural architecture, which yield behavior-biasing
predispositions that are sometimes better adapted to ancestral
conditions than to modern ones." 6 This suggests, in turn, that there
will often be tension between brain function in different regions of
the brain-those inclined toward the once-rational choice and those
inclined (perhaps only after deliberate, self-conscious analysis)
toward the more presently rational outcome. (Imagine, to illustrate,
different networks within the same brain, one saying "go ahead, eat
the tasty ice cream," and another saying "if you do, you'll get fat
from ultra-concentrated calories, and we don't want that, do we?")
luxury
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

brand of chocolates.
Sayman & Onciiler, supra note 5, at 306.
Id.
See Arlen et al., supranote 24, at 18-19.
See Irwin, supra note 16, at 452-53.
See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 1331-32.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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A parallel example will illustrate. Among the suite of cognitive
biases (of which the endowment effect is just one) is a bias sometimes described as an intertemporal choice anomaly. That bias is
evident in a frequent and seemingly irrational preference to choose
a smaller earlier reward over a larger later reward, when either
choice is relatively near, but to reverse that preference for economically equivalent options that are more temporally distant. For
example, people often choose x dollars over x+y dollars, when given
a choice between getting the former today or the latter in one
week-but then choose x+y dollars if given the choice between x
dollars in (say) thirty weeks, or x+y dollars in thirty-one weeks.'1 7
The choice is different, though in either case the one-week delay is
the same.
Reasoning from the time-shifted rationality perspective, Jones
and Goldsmith proposed in a recent article that "temporal distance
may allow the more deliberative parts of the brain greater latitude
than it allows the more emotional parts, when confronted with more
immediate temptation toward earlier gratification."'1 8 As the article
went to press, researchers separately investigating the intertemporal choice phenomenon with brain scanning techniques
(functional magnetic resonance imaging-fMRI) announced findings
entirely consistent with the prediction. Specifically, they found that
the limbic cortex (often referred to as the emotional center of the
brain) is engaged in the preference for initial gratification, but gives
way to less emotive and more analytical processing in the prefrontal
cortex and to deferred gratification, as the time of reward recedes
further into the future. 1 9
The point of this example is that the hypothesis we articulate
here-that evolutionary salience will modulate the presence of and
magnitudes of endowment effects-grows out of the same life
science perspective as the example just given, makes a parallel
prediction (that different areas of the brain, perhaps these same
117. For more on this phenomenon, see Kris N. Kirby & R.J. Herrnstein, Preference
Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83 (1995), and
George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and
Interpretation,107 Q. J. ECON. 573 (1992).
118. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 450-51 n.136.
119. Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed
Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 503 (2004).
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areas, are likely involved), and is equally amenable to investigation
using brain scanning techniques. The fact that brain imagers have
already found this phenomenon in other contexts of a cognitive bias
increases the probability that similar neural phenomena underlie
related biases, such as the endowment effect. For example, we
anticipate that objects may, as a general matter, be cognitively
processed in a meaningfully different way from abstractions and
that this structural and functional brain difference may be what is
generating observed variations in patterns and magnitudes of
endowment effects.
That is, while a mug may be evolutionarily novel, for example, it
is less novel than an abstractright to a mug, which can be traded for
a mug not presently visible. We anticipate that the cognitive
machinery that evaluates the mug is neurologically distinct from
the cognitive machinery that evaluates the abstract right to the
mug. And the parts of the brain evaluating such abstractions
(generally, the prefrontal cortex) are far more recent, evolutionarily,
than parts of the brain that would have long been involved in
assessing the possible value of various tangible objects in the
immediate environment.
CONCLUSION

We have here connected law to biology through economics,
psychology, chimpanzees, and peanut butter. Why? Consider the
context.
Western scholars are products of an educational system that long
ago and artificially divided physical sciences, life sciences, and social
sciences. Over time, as both knowledge and researchers accumulate,
disciplines have tended to divide and sub-divide and further
specialize-finding truths that are deeper, but also narrower and
more isolated. It is now common for scholars within cognate
disciplines to have sufficiently different training, knowledge,
language, and methods that they cannot communicate effectively.
And, though this balkanized structure may increase the supply of
knowledge, it also increases transaction costs (including search costs
and information costs) that often prevent our combining knowledge
in useful ways.
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In recent years, this has inspired many efforts to synthesize
insights from different disciplines into a seamless web of knowledge,
finding and making connections across increasingly large intellectual spaces. Some of these efforts have focused on breaking down
barriers between the life sciences and the social sciences, including
those between biology, psychology, and economics. And our work
here adds to those efforts. Specifically, we have attempted to
show-using a straightforward, exploratory, and potentially
significant example-that combining life science and social science
perspectives may help to provide theoretical foundation for and
potential predictive power concerning various psychological traits
relevant to law. In doing so, it may incrementally contribute to
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of law, by providing a
deeper and more useful understanding of where law-relevant
behavior comes from and why it manifests the way it does. To the
extent that a deeper understanding of the human animal can aid
law's efforts to pursue whatever goals society assigns it, biological
perspectives are an essential part (though not the only essential
part) of the picture.
Against that broader background, let us review the arc of this
Article and summarize some important implications. Findings in
behavioral economics are posing interesting challenges to the
expected utility theory assumptions of neoclassical economics, which
often underlie or influence legal approaches to social and economic
problems. At the end of the day, differences between traditional
economics and behavioral economics will reconcile (one way or the
other), probably resulting in a more robust-if then also more
complex-model of human behavior.
But in the meantime, the precise dimensions, patterns, and
meanings of the various cognitive heuristics and biases inherent in
behavioral economics-including the endowment effect-remain
quite unclear. And this will likely continue, absent a much deeper
understanding of the causes underlying these phenomena that
might bring them together and help to make coherent sense of what
are now simply a seriatim series of puzzling observations.
There are important implications for law if the endowment effect
is as real and robust as its proponents claim. It is therefore
important to understand where the phenomenon comes from, why
it appears when and as it does, and what, in particular, causes the
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seemingly unruly variations in magnitudes of the effects that so
many different studies, in different contexts, have described. Of
course, science will not answer the normative question about
whether the law should make any adjustments in light of endowment effects. But a greater understanding of the endowment effect
would aid efforts to anticipate its appearance, evaluate its consequences, determine when to adopt accommodating, counterbalancing, or debiasing legal moves, and decide how best (if at all) to do so.
To date, however, the social science literature has cast about
within itself for many explanations, including loss aversion. But
none of these is satisfying. Each explanation is fundamentally ad
hoc, with little prospect of understanding why the effect may appear
when and as it does, and even less prospect of connecting the
endowment effect to the various other cognitive heuristics and
biases that researchers have identified. Specifically, we believe that
the failure to make greater progress in understanding the endowment effect is in part symptomatic of a larger failure to more
aggressively integrate social and life science perspectives on human
behavior.
We therefore aspire to a more unified theory. And using a timeshifted rationality perspective, derived from evolutionary biology,
we developed three novel predictions, the combination of which
would emerge from no other known theory. We tested those
predictions in chimpanzees, and report evidence consistent with
those predictions.
First, and as predicted, the endowment effect appears to be
present in chimpanzees (who, along with bonobos, are our closest
living relatives). We believe we are the first researchers to have
documented an endowment effect in non-human primates, and in
chimpanzees in particular. 120 Second, and as predicted, the strength
of the effect in chimpanzees varies across contexts. Third, and as
predicted, the more evolutionarily salient stimuli (food items)
resulted in a stronger endowment effect in chimpanzees than did
less evolutionarily salient stimuli (toys). To our knowledge, we are
the first researchers to have tested a theory-driven hypothesis about

120. One research team has recently begun to study whether five capuchin monkeys may
exhibit an endowment effect. See Santos & Chen, supranote 83.
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variations in the prevalence of endowment effects in non-human
animals.
There are, as with all scientific experiments, important caveats.
For example, the results of this experiment do not alone prove that
the endowment effect definitively exists in all chimpanzees in all
situations (although it does indicate the propensity for an endowment effect in the species). While our perspective does appear to pull
together and make sense of some intriguing aspects of the existing
endowment effect literature, our results do not prove that endowment effects will vary in humans according to the evolutionary
salience of the items at issue. Nor do our results alone prove that
the theory underlying the three predictions is accurate. There may
be some other theory, not yet developed, that explains these data
and more.
However, that the three predictions are supported is suggestive.
It appears that chimpanzees do, under some conditions, exhibit
endowment effects. And that they do so has at least five consequences. First, our results bear upon the existing debate over
whether endowment effects are, as some have argued, mere artifacts
of the language of experimental instructions and subject misunderstandings. The more species there are in which an endowment effect
can be observed, the more likely it seems that the endowment effect
is a meaningful phenomenon in humans.
Second, the results of our experiment increase the likelihood that
there is a common evolutionary root to the endowment effect in
humans, chimpanzees, and perhaps other species. Similar phenomena in different species can be the result of (1) evolutionary
pathways held in common, through common descent, (2) different
evolutionary pressures yielding similar results in distantly related
species, or (3) similar evolutionary pressures that can independently
generate similar phenomena in distantly related species. However,
the more closely two species are related, all else being equal, the
more likely it is that similar phenomena flow from an evolutionary
history common to both species.
Third, and in turn, the results of our experiment suggest that
further research inspired by evolutionary and time-shifted rationality hypotheses may help to uncover additional patterns in endowment effects in humans. Of course, evolutionary salience (or indeed
any other single causal explanation) may not alone explain all
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endowment effect data. However, it likely explains at least some of
the observed variance in endowment effects.
Fourth, our experiment suggests that chimpanzees may be a very
useful animal model for investigating the variety of other cognitive
heuristics and biases known in humans, as they have been useful in
investigating the evolution of many other primate (including
human) behaviors. Reciprocally, it may be possible to first discover
in chimpanzees some previously unknown heuristics and biases that
might then also be tested for and identified in humans.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, this initial test of the
evolutionary perspective on the endowment effect may help lead to
a broader and scientifically coherent reconciliation of cognitive
heuristics and biases, within a combined life-science/social-science
framework of time-shifted rationality. In all, we believe that our
experiment not only has revealed something new about chimpanzee
attitudes toward property, but may also help to forge further
connections between biology, psychology, and economics that are
potentially useful for law.

